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This paper investigates the determinants of primary 
school enrollment, attendance and child labor in Bolivia 
from 1999 to 2007. The analysis also aims at identifying 
the substitution and complementary relationships 
between schooling and working. Although enrollment 
rates show a significant improvement, lack of attendance 
remains an issue. The empirical results reveal that the 
increase in enrollment is led by indigenous children 
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and those living in urban areas. Moreover, contrary to 
common belief, being extremely poor and indigenous 
are the main determinants of school attendance. 
Although extremely poor children increased their school 
attendance, they were not able to reduce child labor. 
However, for indigenous children school attendance and 
child labor were substitutes, increasing schooling and 
reducing child labor. 
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1.  Introduction 
Bolivia remains among the three poorest countries in the western 
hemisphere and the poorest in South America [26], with a per capita GDP of 
1,378 US dollars and with 37.7 percent of the population living below the extreme 
poverty line in 2007
1. According to the United Nations, achieving primary 
education represents a key factor for enhancing development progresses in the 
poorest countries
2. Efforts have been made to guarantee the continuous provision 
of universal, free-of-charge primary education. However, the fact that Bolivia has 
an illiteracy rate of 13 percent for people aged 15 or older confirms that the 
difficulties experienced by its educational system are among the most severe in 
Latin America [29]. 
In order to reaffirm the commitment of the state to improve the educational 
system, a series of cash-transfer benefits and school feeding programs have been 
approved over the last 20 years. These programs are believed to be effectively 
contributing to higher enrollment and attendance rates, nevertheless several 
challenges concerning lack of homogenous implementation across municipalities 
and schools still need to be overcome. Likewise, with the goal of creating 
enabling conditions to guarantee the effective, multiethnic and non-discriminatory 
access to educational services, special programs such as the Intercultural Bilingual 
Educational Program have been developed to attend the needs of the vast 
indigenous population of the country
3. 
Moreover, Bolivia represents a country with a high share of child labor. 
This share achieves about 30 percent among extremely poor families. Child labor 
not only represents an exploitative activity, but it is also associated with a low 
level of education (see Basu and Van [6] for example), therefore jeopardizing 
human capital growth. Yet, as emphasized by Baland and Robinson [4], the real 
issue is to better understand the determinants of child labor so as to evaluate its 
welfare implications. More generally, it is crucial to jointly investigate the factors 
driving schooling and child labor decisions.  
This paper aims at analyzing the determinants of primary school 
enrollment, attendance and child labor in Bolivia from 1999 to 2007, identifying 
how the substitution and complementary relationships among such activities 
evolve over time. 
The unprecedented use of Bolivia’s national household survey MECOVI 
for several years allows for an in-depth historical analysis of the recent trends of 
schooling and child labor. Due to the lack of empirical literature on this specific 
issue for Bolivia, this study represents a contribution that aims at filling the gap. 
Results at the descriptive level reveal that enrollment became 
progressively more widespread in Bolivia. Nonetheless, the attendance figures are 
discouraging, as about 40 percent of the enrolled children did not go to school.  
Triprobit estimations show that the increase in enrollment is led by 
indigenous and children living in urban areas, whereas poverty and indigenous are 
                                                            
1 GDP data are from the United Nations National Accounts Main Aggregate Database, data on 
poverty are from MECOVI 2007. 
2 More specifically, this represents the second Millennium Development Goal (MDG) as 
established by the United Nations. 
3 According to the MECOVI surveys employed, more than 50 percent of the total Bolivian 




the main characteristics driving the attendance behavior. While school feeding 
and conditional cash transfer programs are likely to have allowed extremely poor 
children to attend school, at the same time these do not seem sufficient to let them 
forgo child labor. In fact, the proportion of working children seems not to be 
affected by school incentives since extremely poor children manage to allocate 
their time between school and working activities (presumably reducing their 
leisure time), making those complements. On the contrary, indigenous children 
made them substitutes, increasing schooling and decreasing working. 
Furthermore, the empirical evidence also shows that the implementation of 
the Bono Juancito Pinto (BJP) scholarship in 2006 has a negative effect on 
attendance in 2007 as possibly children tend to enroll to benefit from the first 
installment but they do not attend school afterwards. In addition, the BJP does not 
discourage children abandoning working activities. 
The paper structure is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the education 
system reforms in Bolivia. Section 3 goes through some of the main contributions 
in the empirical literature. The theoretical framework used for the analysis is 
presented in Section 4. The empirical strategy and the model are described in 
Section 5. In Section 6, the descriptive statistics and the empirical findings are 
presented. Section 7 reports the conclusions. 
 
 
2.  The Education System in Bolivia: a Historical Perspective 
This section introduces a brief summary of the main education policies 
adopted in Bolivia in the last two decades.  
Reforms of the education system in Bolivia have been undertaken since 
1905, when the first reform established a national education system. In 1955, the 
second important reform increased education coverage and supported a 
homogenous national culture. The 1970s and the 1980s were marked by a variety 
of education interventions which lacked central coordination or long-term plans. 
  The current Education Reform Program (ERP) is considered the third 
important reform of the Bolivian education system. The Ministry of Planning 
established the Technical Support Team of the Education Reform (ETARE), and 
the Education Reform Law was successfully introduced in 1994. The Educational 
Reform Law stipulates that the Bolivian State has the duty to offer free-of-charge 
education to all citizens, which is equivalent to a sub-guarantee of financial 
protection of the pre-primary, primary and secondary education. As a matter of 
fact, however, educational spending focuses on primary education due to the 
national priority of guarantying access to this level. 
The reform aimed at improving the quality and efficiency of education, 
making it more relevant to the country’s economic needs, broadening its 
coverage, promoting the permanence of educators in the system, and addressing 
the needs of the vast indigenous population of the country
4. Toward these ends, it 
restructured the education system and its administration, extended the years of 
                                                            
4 Many of the programs of the Educational Reform have introduced a set of guarantees that can be 
subject to redress by indigenous people if their right to access educational services in accordance 




mandatory education from five to eight, improved the teacher training system, and 
prioritized primary education incorporating the Intercultural Bilingual Educational 
Program
5. Although a conclusive evaluation is not available, data suggest that 
there have been substantial improvements at the national level. Despite this, 
Bonifaz and Ochoa [8] highlight some deficiencies across municipalities, income 
groups and ethnic groups that jeopardize the achievement of the universal primary 
education.  
There have been other initiatives such as the Programa de Atencion a 
Niños y Niñas Menores de 7 Años (PAN), which was created in April of 1997 by 
the Bolivian government within the 1997-2001 Country Programme of the World 
Food Programme (WFP) with the goal of achieving adequate development and 
growth of children under the age of six. It reaches 72,000 children that are in a 
situation of extreme poverty, and provides them with education, nutrition, 
healthcare and protection. The children who attend these daycare centers are fed 
breakfast and lunch and receive general care during the day while their mothers 
are in class. The Day Care Center has more than 450 centers in the province of 
Chuquisaca, and serves 8,500 children. Unfortunately the budget that the centers 
receive from the state is insufficient and does not cover the basic needs.  
  In 2004, the Street Children Programme was introduced with the aim to 
contribute to the development of 7,200 boys, girls and adolescents who live and 
work on the street through greater access to integrated educational services, health 
and nutrition within a framework of gender equality. The mechanism is food for 
training. 
Among the main policies adopted by the president Evo Morales, the BJP 
became law in 2006. These scholarships benefited approximately 1.2 million 
public school students, from roughly 13,000 schools across the nation. Over half 
of the children targeted by the law (those between the ages of five and ten years 
old) have never attended or do not currently attend school. The money is 
distributed in cash directly to the children in nationwide ceremonies conducted 
with the help of the armed forces. It is paid in installments of 100 Bolivianos, one 
at the beginning and one at the end of the school year (nearly 26.5 US dollars a 
year). All public school children who are in the designated grade levels are 
eligible, regardless of their family’s income. This bonus should encourage the 
children to enroll and remain at school during their required term. However, after 
being enrolled and therefore receiving the first payment, students are not coerced 
to attend school. At the same time, if they do not attend, they prevent themselves 
from being awarded the second trench.  
Today, several school feeding programs are implemented in some 
communities in Bolivia
6. These kinds of programs are believed to be effectively 
contributing to higher enrollment and attendance rates, and are sometimes 
combined with cash transfer programs conditional upon households letting the 
children go to school. An example is the In-School Breakfast Program (Desayuno 
                                                            
5 Education may be monolingual in Spanish with the additional study of an indigenous language or 
it may be bilingual with an indigenous language as the first language and Spanish as the second 
language.  
6 The Ministry of Culture and Education (MEC) declared that the primary targets of such program 





Escolar), which started to be delivered in 1990. Many children walk at least one 
mile to get to school, and receiving a breakfast before starting classes alleviates 
their short-term hunger and lets them benefit more from the lesson. Clearly, it was 
conceived as a supplementary meal, meaning that the parents are supposed to 
provide the children with a first breakfast. However, it is not usually the case. 
Another example is the Programa de Alimentación Escolar (PAE) 
introduced during the 2003-3007 Country Programme of the WFP, from which 
42,000 children over the age of six are benefitting. The aim is to support regular 
primary school attendance and to improve learning capacity by means of hunger 
relief in the short term.  
 
 
3.  Determinants of School Enrollment, Attendance and Child Labor: 
Literature Review 
Education constitutes the main means through which a country invests in 
human capital. Many developing countries still experience low levels of education 
attainment, and this is one of the reasons why they unsurprisingly lag far behind 
the developed world. 
The literature on the determinants of education is vast and to review it 
completely it is beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, before moving to the 
empirical analysis it is worth reviewing some of the main contributions on the 
determinants of households’ demand for schooling and child labor.  
Low levels of education in developing countries might be related to high 
levels of child labor as discussed in Basu and Van [6]. In this paper, which 
constitutes a pillar in the economic literature on child labor, the authors clarify the 
positive relationship between poverty and child labor and therefore the negative 
effect of poverty on children’s education. They claim that education, as well as 
leisure, is a “luxury good” for poor families with an extremely low income
7. In 
their altruistic model, household wealth is the most important factor in the 
decision to send children to school or to work. That is, child labor arises only if 
adult wages are insufficient to sustain the household. Therefore, they argue that a 
ban on child labor may even be welfare reducing for a poor household if poverty 
is the main cause of child labor.  
  On the contrary, Baland and Robinson [4] find that a small ban on child 
labor may constitute an actual Pareto improvement even though it does not 
directly compensate parents. The reason is that endogenous changes in wages 
induced by a reduction in child labor may make parents and firms better off. 
  The empirical investigation carried out by Jayachandran [19] for India 
supports the theoretical results of Basu and Van [6]. He shows that poverty is 
among the key factors that explain why parents cannot afford to send their 
children to school. Along the same line, Psacharopoulos [21] analyzes the 
determinants of school failure and working, confirming that child labor reduces 
educational attainment in Bolivia and Venezuela
8. For the African context, 
                                                            
7 Such concept is called “luxury assumption” or “luxury axiom”. 
8 Note that Psacharopoulos [21] does not focus on the determinants of school enrollment and 
attendance in Bolivia. More specifically, the author does not analyze whether or not a working 




Canagarajah and Coulombe [9] find a significant negative relationship between 
going to school and working in Ghana.  
  In contrast, Ravallion and Wodon [22] question that child labor displaces 
schooling in Bangladesh. In addition, Ray [23] and Bhalotra [7] do not find 
empirical evidence of the “luxury axiom” in the context of Pakistan and India 
respectively
9. 
It is not easy to identify standard key determinants of education due to the 
country-specific socio-cultural characteristics. Schultz [24] attempts to identify 
three key socioeconomic determinants of households’ demand for schooling and 
comes up with public expenditure on education, parental education and the wealth 
of families. 
Spending in public education in developing countries (where the level of 
public infrastructure is typically low) may have a huge impact on stimulating 
education enrollment and attendance. Duflo [12], for example, focuses on the case 
of Indonesia, where a massive school construction program, implemented by the 
national government during the 1970s, led to a strong increase of the enrollment 
rate. Also Handa [15] and Handa and Simler [16] point out that building more 
schools in the context of Mozambique had a strong impact on school enrollment.  
On the other hand, the lack of government support in fostering education 
might have drastic effects on education. In fact, Glewwe and Ilias [13] noted that 
enrollment rates declined in Ghana during the late 1970s and early 1980s due to a 
reduction of public spending in education. Nevertheless, Al-Samarrai [1], 
investigates the link between educational access and public education expenditure 
in a cross-country framework and finds that it is weak. 
Household characteristics, such as the education of parents, probably 
represent one of the most relevant factors leading to children enrollment and 
attendance in the developing world. The idea underlying such claim is that 
educated parents by and large understand the importance of achieving basic 
education and therefore feel responsible to send their kids to school. The reverse 
is true for non-educated parents who started to work at an early age. This is 
evident in Wahba [28] that shows that Egyptian parents, who were child laborers 
themselves, would most likely send their children to work. In other words, for 
those parents education may not necessarily be considered as an investment.  
  Some studies also consider cultural aspects such as gender issues that may 
influence some disparities in enrollment and attendance. Tansel [25] points to 
gender as one characteristic that should not be neglected when analyzing the 
determinants of education. He noted that the effect of income on the schooling of 
girls was larger than that of boys. Al-Samarrai and Peasgood [2] find that 
household characteristics such as parental education may have a totally different 
impact on the education of females and males in Tanzania. Using some 
descriptive statistics, Bonifaz and Ochoa [8] find that Bolivia does not present a 
significant gender gap in terms of total school attendance, even though minor 









4.  Theoretical Framework 
In order to carry out the analysis, Ravallion and Wodon’s [22] theoretical 
framework is adopted, as they jointly analyze the decision of working and 
schooling when school incentives are provided by the government. In fact, as 
noted in Section 2, the school feeding programs provided by the government 
makes this framework appropriate. 
It is assumed that parents are free to determine the time allocation of their 
children. In addition, assuming that parents are altruistic and want the best for 
their kids, they will allocate their time to school, leisure and labor depending on 
the household’s socioeconomic characteristics. 
Drawing from Basu and Van [6], if no school incentive is available and if 
households’ wages are too low, families will be forced to send their children to 
work in order to survive. However, if the government provides children with 
incentives for schooling, households’ decisions on their children’s allocation of 
time may vary according to the relationships occurring among leisure, school and 
work. In particular, as in Ravallion and Wodon [22], it is assumed that families 
have the following utility function: 
 
 Z H S C U U ; ; ;           ( 1 )  
 
  where C is consumption, S stands for schooling, H is leisure and Z is a 
vector of household characteristics. In addition, the child’s total time available is:  
 
L H S T            ( 2 )  
 
  where L is the time devoted to labor. Considering w as the wage received 
for working and b  as the incentive received to enroll/attend school, the budget 
constraint faced by the families is: 
 
) (Z Y bS wL C             ( 3 )  
 
where ) (Z Y  represents the household’s income as a function of the above 
mentioned vector of household characteristics. Therefore, if parents maximize the 
utility function subject to the time available and the budget constraint, the latter 
can be rewritten as: 
 
 ) (Z Y wT wH S b w C             ( 4 )  
 
Note that  b w  is the price of attending school
10. Thus, w and b  are 
turn out to be crucial when allocating time. Assuming strict quasi-concavity of the 
utility function, the problem here is to evaluate the impact of an increase of school 
incentive on labor. As shown in Ravallion and Wodon [22], the impact of an 
                                                            
10 The final constraint can be obtained by pricing the amount of time by w  (as the wage 
determines the price of the time). Moreover, by inserting wT  in the initial constraint on both side 





























     ( 5 )  
 
Under the concavity assumption ofU , the first and third term are strictly 
negative. On the other hand, the second term might be either positive or negative. 
Therefore, the effect of a subsidy that increases schooling has an ambiguous effect 
on child labor. More specifically, if leisure and schooling are (utility-
compensating) substitutes, a school incentive may have either no or positive 
impact on child labor. On the other hand, the effect on child labor is negative if 
schooling and leisure are complements. Thus, in the former scenario child labor 
increases or stays the same as schooling increases, whereas in the latter child labor 
decreases. 
According to the previous setup, by identifying the determinants of school 
attendance, enrollment and child labor in Bolivia, the empirical analysis as 
described in the following section allows inferring how Bolivian households 
allocate time and thus whether these goods are complements or substitutes. More 
specifically, the evaluation of the determinants across time (1999-2007) helps 
shading light on the dynamics of the joint schooling/child labor decisions made by 
different groups such as (not) indigenous and (not) extremely poor households.    
 
 
5.  Empirical Strategy 
  This section describes the chosen empirical strategy, while the model 
specification is illustrated in the following subsection. 
The enrollment, attendance and working decisions are modeled assuming 
that these are made by a representative agent within the household wishing to 
maximize his or her family’s welfare.  
Therefore, a linear random utility function is employed, where the utility 
associated with both the decision to enroll or not to enroll the child in primary 
school is assumed to be a linear function of a set of household’s socio-economic 
characteristics ) ( i X , and of a stochastic term, which represents unobservable and 
measurement errors ) ( i  . Hence, the indirect utility of household i associated 
with the enrollment decision  ) ( ,E i U and not enrollment  ) ( ,N i U can be expressed as: 
 
E i E i E i X U , , ) (                ( 6 )  
N i N i N i X U , , ) (                ( 7 )  
 
Thus, the representative agent of the household i will choose to enroll the 
child if the utility associated with the decision is higher than the utility associated 
with the alternative decision:  ) ( ) ( , , N i E i U U  . If a variable Y  is defined such that 
1 ,  E i Y  if the 
th i  household enrolls the child and  0 ,  E i Y  if it does not, the 
probability that the 




  ) ( ) Pr( ) 1 ( , , , N E X U U Y i N i E i E i         , where   is the cumulative 
distribution function of  N i E i , ,    . 
Normalizing the utility of not enrolling the child in school to zero 
) 0 ( ,  N i U  it is possible to derive the empirical equation for the enrollment 
decision: 
 
   i E i E i X U Y      ) 0 Pr( ) 1 Pr( , ,          ( 8 )  
 
Similarly, other two equations are derived to model the probability of the 
same household i to let the child attend school and work: 
 
   i A i A i X U Y      ) 0 Pr( ) 1 Pr( , ,          ( 9 )  
   i W i W i X U Y      ) 0 Pr( ) 1 Pr( , ,        ( 1 0 )  
 
where  A i U ,  and  W i U ,  are the indirect utilities associated with sending the child to 
school and to work. 
Therefore, it is possible to empirically analyze the household’s 
determinants of enrollment, attendance and working behavior through the 
estimation of  ,   and   parameters in the empirical equations (8), (9) and (10).  
The most common econometric regression procedure to estimate these 
equations by Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) is the Probit model
11. It 
assumes that the error term is normally distributed with mean zero and variance 
  equal to one, and  (.)   is the cumulative distribution function for a standard 
normal random variable. Nonetheless, a possible issue with this approach is that it 
does not consider the correlation among the household’s decisions on enrollment, 
attendance and working. Hence, the univariate approach estimation of the three 
correlated equations is not a fully efficient econometric procedure, as it ignores 
the correlation among the error terms. 
  Due to the clear interrelation among the dependent variables of interest, 
the estimation method must reflect the joint decision making process. More 
specifically, enrollment, attendance and working cannot be treated as independent 
decisions. This rules out the possibility of using a multinomial Logit model since 
it assumes that all variables are considered independent. That is, as already 
considered by Wabha [28], using a multinomial Logit model would imply that the 
decision to work is independent or, in other words, not affected by whether or not 
a schooling option is available. It should be noted that the empirical works aiming 
at analyzing jointly the schooling and working decisions did not pay enough 
attention to the interdependence problem. For example, Psacharopoulos [21], 
Patrinos and Psacharopoulos [20] as well as Ravallion and Wodon [22], when 
modeling schooling and working do not allow for a multivariate specification that 
would have tackled the endogeneity among the dependent variables. Only Wabha 
[28] uses a bivariate Probit procedure in modeling child labor and schooling. 
                                                            
11 The alternative is to use Logit regressions, assuming an error term logistically distributed. 
However, the Probit model has been preferred because of its theoretical extensions associated to 




  Thus, given the hypothesis of interdependence among the three variables 
of interest, a trivariate Probit model (Triprobit) is employed. This, in fact, allows 
for the existence of possible correlated disturbances.  
 
  i E i X Y    ) 1 Pr( ,          ( 1 1 )  
  i A i X Y    ) 1 Pr( ,            ( 1 2 )  
  i W i X Y    ) 1 Pr( ,          ( 1 3 )  
 
In this model, the error terms follow a trivariate normal distribution: 
 
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ,    W i A i E i E E E     
1 ) ( ) ( ) ( , , ,    W i A i E i V V V           ( 1 4 )  
     ) , , ( , , , W i A i E i Cov  
 
The evaluation of the likelihood function requires the computation of 
trivariate normal integrals. For example: 
 
W i A i E i
XX
W i A i E i
X
W
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   
     (15) 
 
  The model is estimated by the method of simulated maximum likelihood 
(SML). In particular, the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) smooth recursive 
simulator is used to evaluate the three-dimensional Normal integrals in the 
likelihood function (see Hajivassilious et al., [17]).  
For each observation, a likelihood contribution is calculated for each 
replication, and the simulated likelihood contribution is the average of the values 
derived from all the replications. The simulated likelihood function for the sample 
as a whole is then maximized using the standard maximum likelihood technique. 
Given the nature of the data, the Triprobit methodology does not consider 
fully the character of the correlation (selection) between the variables in this 
empirical case. In fact, the enrollment decision determines completely the 
possibility of attending school, selecting households that can actually take the 
latter decision, and a non-random sample selection could generate biased 
estimates as specified in Heckman [18]. An econometric approach that can be 
considered to deal with this problem is to specify a tivariate Probit with sample 
selection model, and adapt the Heckman two-step procedure to this dichotomous 
case (Van de Ven et al., [27]). However, the lack of an instrumental variable did 
not allow the authors to adopt such extension. 
Moreover, the longitudinal dimension of the data is not explored, as any 
methodology that takes it into account (i.e. pseudo panel or pooled cross sections) 
would not allow investigating the substitution and complementary relationships of 
the dependent variables over the considered period. 
Gouriéroux and Montfort [14] show that under standard conditions the 




draws tends to infinity, and is asymptotically equivalent to the true maximum 
likelihood estimator as the ratio of the square root of the sample size to the 
number of draws tends to zero. 
Note that since the Triprobit is an ad-hoc procedure, the calculation of the 
marginal effects and their standard deviations is not provided by the standard 
statistical packages. Therefore, both the marginal effects and the standard 
deviations have been computed using the procedure suggested by Anderson and 
Newell [3] and subsequently corrected by Carlevaro and Sénégas [10]. 
 
 
5.1. The Model 
Considering the methodological issues presented in the previous section, 
the following equation is estimated for each year: 
 
)
( ) 1 Pr(
8 7 6 5 4
3 2 1 0
BJP ExtPoverty EdFHead EdMHead Spanish
Urban Indigenous Male Age Y
    
    
   
       
    (16) 
 
 Where  Y is the probability of the event Enrollment in the first equation, 
Attendance in the second one and Working in the last one. 
Note that, apart from Age, all the variables used in the equations are 
dichotomous. The dependent variable Enrollment takes the value one when the 
child is enrolled in the current year into primary school and zero otherwise. 
Attendance takes the value one if the child answers that he is currently attending 
the course he got into during the current year and zero otherwise. Finally, 
Working takes value one when the child answers that he worked at least one hour 
during the previous week and zero otherwise. 
Beyond the continuous variable Age, a set of dummy variables has been 
added as regressors of the three equations. Namely, Male identifies a male child; 
Indigenous takes the value if the child answers positively the question about his 
feeling of belonging to an indigenous group and zero otherwise. However, since 
many children were not able to answer this question, those who have both the 
mother and the father declaring to belong to an indigenous group are also defined 
as indigenous. Urban, Spanish and Poverty identify a child that respectively lives 
in an urbanized area, can speak Spanish as first or second language, and that is 
living in extreme poverty conditions
12 and zero otherwise
13. 
Moreover, EdMHead (educated male head) and EdFHead (educated 
female head) have been added to the equations. These take the value of one if the 
child belongs to a family with an educated male or female head, and zero 
otherwise. A head is defined as educated if he or she has completed at least 
primary school. 
Finally, using the available data the impact of the BJP is analyzed by 
adding a dummy variable in the 2007 regression that identifies those who received 
such scholarship in 2006. 
                                                            
12 The definition of extreme poverty used in the surveys is based on the Unsatisfied Basic Needs 
(NBI) Index. 







6.  Empirical Analysis 
This section firstly describes the data employed and illustrates some 
descriptive statistics. Secondly, the results from the estimation of the model are 
presented and discussed. 
 
6.1. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper was obtained from Bolivia’s national 
household survey MECOVI
14 for 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2005, 2006 and 2007. 
This survey is conducted at the end of each year, typically in November and 
December.  
The age of entry in primary school is six and the duration of compulsory 
education is eight years. Therefore, samples of children who are between five and 
fifteen years
15 are selected in this analysis. The academic year is composed of 
about forty weeks, five days a week and four hours per day.  
The focus of the analysis does not encompass private schools
16, as the 
enrollment and attendance behaviors are likely to be driven by different factors. 




[Table 1 about here] 
 
 
It is relevant to note that the population is fairly distributed in many of its 
features as gender, ethnic origin, living area and extreme poverty.  
In fact, the proportion of male children in the population is roughly the 
same of the female one. Moreover, the proportion of indigenous children is 
slightly higher than the non-indigenous one. Likewise, extremely poor children 
are faintly more than non-extremely poor ones in all but one year (data in 1999 
are out of the average because the definition of poor instead of extremely poor has 
been adopted). In the last two years, the proportion of children coming from urban 
areas exceeded the one of those coming from rural ones, albeit maintaining a 
certain level of symmetry in the population. 
Finally, children speaking Spanish are more than 90 percent in all years 
and it is quite unusual for a child to have an educated head, but it is relatively 
more common that this is the father instead of the mother. 
The data presented in Table 2 shows the proportions of children enrolled 
in primary public school, attending it and carrying out working activities. It is 
clear that the percentage of enrolled children has been increasing over the 
considered years. However, the attendance proportions do not show any clear 
                                                            
14 MECOVI is a regional program that aims at standardizing household surveys in the Latin 
American and Caribbean region, funded by the World Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank, and the United Nations. 
15 A slightly wider age interval has been used to allow for children that go to school one year 
before or one year later the traditional age of entry. 




pattern, and displays the worst value in 2007 after some years of improvement. 
Finally, the working proportions seem to be relatively stable over the years. 
 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
 
Although the figures on enrollment are suggesting that the country is on 
path for achieving universal primary education, attendance proportions cast 
doubts on the fulfillment of the target relative to the completion of primary 
school. 
Table 3 presents the characteristics of children who enroll/attend school 
and those of children that are involved in working activities. 
 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, indigenous children enrolled less than non-indigenous 
ones. However, the gap has been reducing over time, nullifying the difference 
between the two groups. More interestingly, the proportion of children who attend 
primary school is somewhat higher for indigenous people than for non-indigenous 
ones for all the years. Therefore before 2002, indigenous children enrolled less, 
but if they did so, they attended more than non-indigenous ones. Likewise, even 
when the enrollment proportions became roughly equal, indigenous children 
attend relatively more. Looking at the working proportions, it is clear that 
indigenous children work more than non-indigenous ones. However, after a peak 
in 2005, the indigenous proportion started to decrease by more than 5 percentage 
points each year, whereas the non-indigenous remained the same. 
If a child is extremely poor, he is less likely to enroll in primary school, 
but, again, if he does so, he attends more than a non-extremely poor one. For both 
extremely and non-extremely poor the enrollment proportion has increased, while 
the attendance proportion is quite volatile and no clear trend emerges. As 
expected, extremely poor children work more than non-extremely poor ones. 
Figure 1 illustrates the working proportion gap between extremely poor 
and indigenous children. 
 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
The gap from being negative became positive and progressively widened, 
reaching its maximum amplitude in 2006 and 2007. Given that indigenous and 
extremely poor children report similar child labor proportions, this suggests that 
indigenous children reduced labor compared with extremely poor children. On the 
contrary, extremely poor children seem not having reduced child labor (see also 
Table 3). Moreover, given that both groups increased attendance as discussed 
above, it is then relevant to further investigate whether or not indigenous (and 




  Living in an urbanized area seems to be important for enrolling although 
this feature seems to lose importance in the last two years. As for the indigenous 
people, the proportion of not enrolled children from the rural areas has been 
substantially declining across the considered period, whereas it has been only 
slightly reducing for those not enrolled in the urban areas. Yet, the proportion of 
enrolled children in urban areas remains higher than that in rural areas. Contrary 
to the common belief, children from rural areas tend to attend primary school 
more than those living in urban areas in most of the years. 
  Spanish-speaking children usually enroll in school much more than non-
Spanish-speaking ones. As mentioned, this has been one of the main focuses of 
the ERP that addressed the problem through the Intercultural Bilingual 
Educational Program. As for the indigenous, a non-Spanish speaking child, when 
enrolled, tends to attend more than a Spanish speaking one. Non-Spanish speaking 
children tend to work more than Spanish speaking ones. Nonetheless a downward 
trend in the last three years is observable. 
  Gender does not seem to be an issue for the enrollment and attendance in 
Bolivia; however, if for both males and females the proportion of enrolled 
children improves across years (in particular from 2005), this is not true for the 
attendance behavior. Males tend to work more than females for all but one year. 
Yet, the surveys do not provide a detailed household members’ domestic activity 
section for all years. Therefore, it is important to be aware about a potential bias. 
  Finally, the education of the head seems to play a relevant role in let 
children enrolling and in taking them away from labor.  
 
6.2. Presentation and Interpretation of the Results 
Tables 4 and 5 show the empirical results relative to the trivariate Probit 
estimation. As illustrated in Table 4, overall the cross-equation error terms appear 
strongly correlated, justifying the adoption of a multivariate framework and 
tackling the working endogeneity problem. 
 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
According to the econometric results, extremely poor children tend not to 
enroll in the first years of the analysis. Yet, in the last three years this pattern 
changes and in 2006 a positive and significant coefficient shows up. Interestingly, 
indigenous children are more likely to enroll than the non-indigenous ones. 
Among the regressors of the enrollment equation, it is evident that urban is 
the most important determinant positively affecting the choice to be enrolled in 
primary school for the whole period.  
Being able to speak Spanish positively affects the probability of being 
enrolled across years. In addition, older children tend to enroll less. 
Averaging across years, around 60 percent of working children’s fathers is 




schooling as an investment as also noted in Whaba [28] for Egypt. The empirical 
analysis supports the previous statement since having an educated parent 
positively affects the probability of being enrolled.  
Undesirably, the gender issue is evident for almost every year under 
consideration. In fact, males are generally more likely to enroll in primary school. 
Overall, it seems that the picture of enrollment of children in primary 
school is positive and improving across time. The proportion of not enrolled 
children drop from 9.2 percent in 1999 to 4.4 percent in 2007 and the empirical 
analysis of the determinants as in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the increase of 
enrollment happens in urban areas and among indigenous.  
Regrettably, the attendance analysis does not draw the same encouraging 
picture. As seen in Table 2, the proportion of children who attend school is on 
average clearly below 60 percent. In other words, almost all the children enrolled 
in primary school but few attended it. Thus, it turns out to be crucial to analyze 
the determinants of attendance. 
The most interesting and important variables in the attendance equation 
are indigenous and extreme poverty. The indigenous variable reports the strongest 
positive marginal effect in the attendance equation and the impact shows an 
upward trend over the years, achieving about 20 percent in 2007. Such result 
could be linked to the effects of the inclusive policies for people belonging to 
indigenous groups. Moreover, it is clear from Tables 4 and 5 that being extremely 
poor has a positive and significant impact in most of the years. In addition, in the 
last two years the marginal effects increase up to 14 percent. It seems plausible 
that extremely poor children are more motivated than non-extremely poor ones to 
attend school because of school feeding and conditional cash transfers programs 
adopted in several municipalities in Bolivia. In this sense, attending school turns 
out to be very important for an extremely poor child and the family. 
The Spanish variable is positive and significant in most of the years, 
highlighting that not being able to speak Spanish not only discourages children to 
enroll, but also represents an obstacle for the children to attend. Therefore, it 
seems that policies that introduced the bilingual intercultural education were not 
successful.  
As for the enrollment probability results, older children tend to attend less. 
However, the magnitude of the marginal effects is quite low after 2000. 
Children with educated parents are more likely to attend school, although 
this is not as evident as for the enrollment equation. 
The coefficients of the urban variable show an interesting trend. From 
2000 through 2002 children in urban areas attended school more than those in 
rural areas. Nevertheless, the trend has changed across time and in the last two 
years the coefficients become negative and significant, meaning that children 
from rural areas started to attend more than in the previous years. This is in line 
with previous results, in that extremely poor indigenous children tend to live in 
rural areas.  
The results relative to the BJP variable deserve special attention. Note that 
those children who benefited from the scholarship in 2006 tend to enroll, but do 
not attend school in 2007. This is particularly evident when considering that the 
variable has the highest marginal effect in the 2007 enrollment equation while it 




children get only the first installment (that is the one due at the enrollment act), 
foregoing the second one (disbursed at the end of the academic year). Therefore, it 
seems that this program encourages free riding behavior since children seem to 
take advantage of it without caring about the learning phase. 
Finally, the working estimation results help to better understand the 
interaction among the three phenomena. Child labor is mainly concentrated in 
rural areas and parental education plays a relevant role in reducing the probability 
of the child to engage in working activities.  
The variable age shows a positive and significant effect in all the years 
under analysis. This is likely to be due to the increase in child labor productivity 
as age rises. Unsurprisingly, those who do not speak Spanish tend to work more. 
Being indigenous generally leads to child labor across the initial years. 
However, the effect of such determinant diminishes afterwards and in the last two 
years is not significant. In other words, indigenous children are less likely to work 
after 2005, the year of the election of the first indigenous President Morales. On 
the other hand, it can be observed an increasing and significant impact of the 
extremely poor variable across years. Therefore, as already noted from Figure 1, 
despite indigenous children reduced working, the reverse is true for extremely 
poor children. 
Being male is a relevant determinant of child labor. Nevertheless, it should 
be remembered that the definition of working does not encompass the domestic 
work, typically carried out by females. Therefore, such coefficients could be 
biased as noted in Contreras et al [11]. 
Interestingly, the BJP variable reports a positive though not significant 
coefficient and this is an important finding that comes along with the result of the 
BJP in the attendance equation. More specifically, not only the BJP seems not to 
increase school attendance but it also does not discourage children to leave 
working activities.  
To sum up, the decision of attending school is mainly driven by 
indigenous people and by a welfare improvement of the extremely poor families. 
In other words, extremely poor families need to benefit from the higher income 
provided by both child labor and school attendance. Although schooling programs 
oriented to extremely poor children achieved some positive results, the proportion 
of enrolled children who do not attend school is still high and those poor who 
attend are not able to forgo the income coming from labor. Accordingly, it seems 
that the “luxury assumption” by Basu and Van [6] does not hold in the case of 
Bolivia since the majority of children attending primary school are extremely 
poor. Nevertheless, the Bolivian context is characterized by incentives that are not 
considered in the authors’ framework. 
Finally, the empirical results allow explaining how schooling/labor 
decisions interact across different groups and time. More specifically, given the 
theoretical framework considered in section 4, two clear features seem to emerge 
from our analysis. In fact, empirical evidence shows that in Bolivia there is no 
substitution between working and schooling among extremely poor children. 
However, the same cannot be argued for the indigenous children, who became 
able to substitute between such goods. It should be also observed that attending 




taken in consideration in order to implement further educational policies oriented 
to increasing school attendance.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
This paper contributes to the existing education literature by analyzing the 
determinants of school enrollment, attendance and working in Bolivia from 1999 
to 2007. 
Using a trivariate Probit model, evidence is found of a significant increase 
in enrollment among indigenous children and children living in urban areas. In 
general the proportion of not enrolled children in primary school is steadily 
decreasing, achieving 4.4 percent in 2007. However, about 40 percent of the 
enrolled children are not attending school. When analyzing the determinants of 
the attendance behavior, poverty and indigenous turn out to be the most important 
characteristics. Nonetheless, the same variables show different patterns in the 
working estimation. In fact, if indigenous children are progressively quitting their 
jobs, extremely poor children cannot. 
The enrollment figures look promising when evaluating the achievement 
of the second MDG on universal primary education, but suggest that further 
efforts are required to allow children to attend school and abandon work activities.  
Education policies aiming at spreading primary education to indigenous 
and extremely poor children seem to have produced positive effects. More 
specifically, inclusive policies toward the indigenous, school feeding, and 
conditional cash transfer programs allowed indigenous and poor children to attend 
school. On the other hand, the BJP initiative seems to encourage free riding 
behavior, leading people to enroll but not to attend. The reason for this might be 
that the second installment of the BJP is not large enough for many extremely 
poor children to forgo working. 
  Thus, it is evident that the attendance decision, corresponding to the 
learning phase, is led by a plain welfare improvement of the extremely poor 
families rather than an investment for the future. In fact, it can be inferred that 
there is no substitution between working and schooling among extremely poor 
children. In other words, as already found by Ravallion and Wodon [21] in the 
case of Bangladesh, it seems that child labor does not displace schooling among 
extremely poor individuals in Bolivia. On the contrary, indigenous children 
became able to substitute between such goods. 
  There are three main caveats of the analysis. First, as mentioned, the 
absence of domestic work data could bias the obtained results with relation to the 
gender issue. Second, the analysis is carried out at the national level, disregarding 
any different dynamic that is occurring at the local level. Finally, the absence of a 
good instrument to control for the selection problem could be a potential source of 
bias. 
  The results have four main policy implications. Policies aiming to foster 
enrollment in rural areas should be promoted. At the same time, incentives and 
measures to stimulate school participation need to be revised in order to 
encourage child labor abandonment by the poorest. Moreover, a different setting 
of the installments of the BJP should be devised to avoid free riding and 




not forget those non-extremely poor children that are fully enrolled but hardly 
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Table 1: Proportions in the population 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male        51.2 50.8 50.6 50.9 53.6 52.4 50.6 
Female      48.8 49.2 49.4 49.1 46.4 47.6 49.4 
 
Indigenous                63.8 53.5 58.5 54.8 54.7 50.9 51.3 
Non-indigenous    36.2 46.5 41.5 45.2 45.3 49.1 48.7 
 
Urban               43.1  46.5  43.3  49.2  45.3  56.7  57.4 
Rural       56.9 53.5 56.7 50.8 54.7 43.3 42.6 
 
Spanish                    99.1 97.0 93.7 91.2 98.7 96.8 95.0 
Non-Spanish      0.9 3.0 6.3 8.8 1.3 3.2 5.0 
 
Ed M Head           -  -  27.8  20.0  26.9  32.2  29.9 
Non-ed M Head    -  -  72.2 80.0 73.1 67.8 70.1 
 
Ed F Head          -  -  4.1  10.0  5.5  5.3  6.6 
Non-ed F Head    -  -  95.9 90.0 94.5 94.7 93.4 
 
Extr.  poor                    78.4 54.4 55.6 54.3 52.4 48.5 53.4 
Non-extr. poor    21.6  45.6 44.4 45.7 47.6 51.5 46.6 
 







  Table 2: Enrollment, Attendance and Working 
 
    1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006    2007
 
  Enrollment  (%)  90.8 91.1 90.9 91.1 94.6 94.2 95.6 
 
  Attendance  (%)  53.2 71.2 49.5 55.0 62.1 75.4 50.6 
 
  Working  (%)              26.5 19.1 22.2 20.3 17.04  19.5 21.9 
 





Table 3: Enrollment, Attendance and Working Proportions 
 
                    Enrollment 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male        85.9 83.5 84.9 85.1 90.9 89.5 91.3 
Female      82.3 82.5 83.1 83.4 88.2 86.2 89.2 
 
Indigenous                81.1 82.0 84.0 84.4 89.6 88.2 89.6 
Non-indigenous    88.6 83.8 83.2 84.8 89.6 87.7 90.4 
 
Urban               90.2  87.6  88.7  88.2  94.0  89.7  91.5 
Rural       77.8 77.9 78.8 80.1 84.9 86.2 88.8 
 
Spanish                    84.0 84.2 85.6 86.0 90.4 88.4 90.9 
Non-Spanish      42.9 29.5 61.6 67.9 54.8 76.8 79.4 
 
Ed M Head           -  -  85.8  84.7  95.6  90.7  92.8 
Non-ed M Head    -  -  82.5 78.9 87.2 87.0 88.1 
 
Ed F Head          -  -  90.8  88.6  96.9  95.5  92.5 
Non-ed F Head    -  -  84.6 73.1 83.5 83.3 91.1 
 
Extr.  poor                    82.7 80.4 81.9 82.2 88.0 87.2 89.3 
Non-extr. poor    89.3  85.9 86.4 86.8 92.1 88.9 91.5 
 
                                        Attendance 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male        55.0 67.7 52.1 59.9 62.3 73.0 48.3 
Female      54.9 65.0 52.5 59.7 58.4 74.7 50.6 
 
Indigenous                62.4 73.5 55.4 66.8 74.4 81.9 58.8 
Non-indigenous    40.0 58.1 45.7 49.2 40.9 60.5 33.6 
 
Urban               43.2  60.6  55.8  67.7  54.8  66.5  42.4 
Rural        69.0 73.6 48.1 50.4 67.4 81.3 58.1 
 
Spanish                    52.5 65.7 51.5 60.9 60.1 73.8 49.0 
Non-Spanish      50.4 77.8 69.4 58.4 94.8 73.7 60.0 
 
Ed M Head           -  -  52.4  60.3  57.6  69.4  50.7 
Non-ed  M  Head    -  -  50.4 48.5 61.5 76.8 47.4 
 
Ed F Head          -  -  51.1  63.2  70.3  57.7  44.7 
Non-ed  F  Head    -  -  62.0 56.5 59.3 70.3 54.8 
 
Extr.  poor                      58.9 72.5 52.7 60.6 67.2 82.0 59.2 
Non-extr. poor    41.9  60.1 51.9 58.9 54.2 64.7 38.7 
 
                       Working 
          1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Male        26.4 20.6 23.2 23.0 31.0 24.4 21.9 
Female      26.1 15.8 18.3 18.6 22.6 22.0 17.5 
 
Indigenous                31.0 24.1 25.4 25.9 35.3 30.0 24.6 
Non-indigenous    17.2 11.5 14.4 14.2 15.2 15.4 15.6 
 
Urban               8.8  6.7  7.8  7.4  10.2  6.4  5.4 
Rural       45.1 31.7 35.9 36.0 45.2 40.2 36.8 
 
Spanish                    37.0 27.2 20.1 18.8 26.3 22.3 19.0 
Non-Spanish      85.8 75.4 36.8 45.3 64.7 60.5 39.7 
 
Ed M Head           -  -  17.7  20.2  14.1  12.2  10.0 
Non-ed M Head    -  -  22.7 33.8 34.7 32.0 27.7 
 
Ed F Head          -  -  12.8  14.2  8.5  3.7  8.8 
Non-ed F Head    -  -  23.2 33.0 32.1 19.9 19.3 
 
Extr.  poor                      29.5 23.8 26.1 27.8 36.2 33.4 28.0 
Non-extr. poor    15.0  12.1  14.9 12.8 16.8    11.9 10.3 
 
 












1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007
 




Table 4: Enrollment, Attendance and Working Coefficients: Trivariate Probit Regressions 
 
 
                    Enrollment 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007 
 
Age      -.334*** -.435*** -.184*** -.169*** -.412*** -.231*** -.258*** 
     (-5.66)  (-7.70)  (-10.25)  (-9.77) (-6.09) (-6.76) (-5.43) 
 
Male      .413***  .159 .060 .168**  .184 .323***  .078 
     (3.48)  (1.45)  (0.86)  (2.54) (1.37) (3.15) (0.57) 
 
Indigenous          .073  .149  .271*** .203*** .104  .419***  .320** 
     (0.53)  (1.25)  (3.83)  (2.91) (0.78) (3.70) (2.40) 
 
Urban             .856*** .627*** .616*** .348*** .361**  .400*** .379*** 
     (6.61)  (5.20)  (7.88)  (4.35) (2.02) (3.51) (2.57) 
 
Spanish           .808  1.204***.744*** .548*** .822**  .613**  .292   
     (1.29)  (4.86)  (5.35)  (5.08) (2.32) (2.48) (1.11) 
 
EdMHead           dropped dropped -.005  .255**  .494*** .634*** .383**   
       (-0.06)  (2.44)  (2.64)  (4.35)  (2.10) 
 
EdFHead         dropped dropped -.009  .258*  5.451***.582*  .111   
       (-0.05)  (1.67)  (29.94)  (1.79)  (0.30) 
 
Extr. poor           -.040   -.257**  -.113 -.129*  -.030 .234* -.190 
     (-0.23)  (-2.25)  (-1.49)  (-1.76) (-0.22) (1.89)  (-1.25) 
 
BJP                     . . . . . . .845*** 
           ( 4 . 2 9 )  
 
Constant             .823  1.102** .584*** .630*** .212  .603**  1.371*** 
     (1.19)  (3.39)  (3.83)  (4.01) (0.55) (2.26) (4.35) 
 
 
                    Attendance 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007   
 
Age      -.168*** -.208*** -.018*  -.022**  -.161*** -.052*** -.001 
     (-3.43)  (-4.98)  (-1.74)  (-2.25) (-3.38) (-3.51  (-0.04) 
 
Male      .190*  .065 -.008  .028 .116 .066 -.073 
     (1.91)  (0.77)  (-0.18)  (0.59) (1.18) (0.97) (-1.10) 
 
Indigenous          .297*** .450*** .299*** .619*** .788*** .497***  .569*** 
     (2.69)  (4.91)  (5.88)  (12.07) (7.69)  (7.17)  (8.34) 
 
Urban             -.235**  .230*** .439*** .647*** .048  -.157**  -.186** 
     (-2.28)  (2.65)  (8.92)  (11.94) (0.43)  (-2.05) (-2.35) 
 
Spanish           .865  .961***-.196*  .189**  .275  .451**  .216 
     (1.27)  (3.95)  (-1.64)  (2.08) (0.72) (2.09) (1.30) 
 
EdMHead           dropped dropped .012  .247*** .081  .206*** .385*** 
       (0.22)  (2.77)  (0.70)  (2.62)  (5.09) 
 
EdFHead         dropped dropped -.099  .296**  .572**  .144  .300*   
       (-0.71)  (2.44)  (2.16)  (0.83)  (1.91) 
 
Extr.  poor                  .038 .100 .016 .149***  .152 .371***  .415*** 
     (0.30)  (1.14)  (0.33)  (2.88) (1.45) (5.07) (5.63) 
 
BJP                     . . . . . . -.023 
           ( - 0 . 2 9 )  
 
Constant             -.652  -.573*  -.299**  -1.084***-.829*  -.400*  -.842*** 






Table 4 (Continued) 
 
 
                      Working 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007   
 
Age      .118**  .234*** .138*** .158*** .145*** .151*** .141*** 
     (2.36)  (4.57)  (11.93)  (13.84) (3.05)  (7.97)  (7.00) 
 
Male      -.052  .286*** .238*** .254*** .350*** .123  .214** 
     (-0.47)  (2.94)  (4.29)  (4.59) (3.36) (1.37) (2.52) 
 
Indigenous          .280**  .164*** .160*** .174*** .431*** .087   .010 
     (2.23)  (1.52)  (2.71)  (3.07) (4.03) (1.05) (0.12) 
 
Urban             -1.105***-.808***-1.003***-.986***-.964***-1.083***-1.175*** 
     (-9.32)  (-8.12)  (-17.07)  (-16.18) (-8.73)  (-11.11) (-12.91) 
 
Spanish           -.773*  -.799***  -.367***  -.610***  -.398  -.534**  -.154 
     (-1.65)  (-3.22)  (-2.95)  (-6.83) (-1.14) (-2.41) (-0.92) 
 
EdMHead           dropped dropped -.074  -.157*  -.277**  -.111  -.231** 
       (-1.17)  (-1.76)  (-2.03)  (-0.78)  (-2.28) 
 
EdFHead         dropped dropped -.159  -.043  -.522*  -.604  -.274 
       (-1.04)  (-0.31)  (-1.82)  (-1.61)  (-1.11) 
 
Extr. poor         .148  .117  .147**  .159*** .145  .472*** .239*** 
     (1.07)  (1.22)  (2.54)  (2.60) (1.40) (5.26) (2.54) 
 
BJP                     . . . . . . .104 
           ( 1 . 0 8 )  
 
Constant             .289  -.560*  -.491***  -.262**  -.319  -.324  -1.990*** 
     (0.55)  (1.64)  (-3.63)  (-2.01) (-0.87) (-1.34) (-6.73) 
 
 
Log ps. Likelihood   -8.2e+5 -7.5e+5  -1.7e+6  -1.8 e+6 -8.0 e+5 -1.6 e+6 -1.6 e+6 
 
Wald Test (ρ=0)    280.91 269.60 783.83 950.09 3831.58  501.22 608.30  
(Prob>  Chi2)    (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)  
 
Observations    935  1416 4517 4459 1186 2421 2487 
 
ρ 21      .677*** .808*** .467*** .580*** .493*** .517*** .419*** 
     (13.33)  (26.59)  (14.18)  (19.88) (7.17)  (10.45) (7.65) 
 
ρ  31      -.382*** -.450*** -.145*** -.241*** -.253*** -.266*** -.051 
     (-6.21)  (-8.08)  (-3.54)  (-6.09) (-3.66) (-4.12) (-0.61) 
 
ρ  32      -.265*** -.405*** -.082**  -.132*** -.014  -.049  .042 
     (-4.35)  (-6.92)  (-2.44)  (-4.20) (-0.22) (-0.95) (0.86) 
 
LR  test     1.6e+6 1.5e+6 3.5e+6 3.7e+6 1.6e+6 3.4e+6 3.2e+6 
(Prob>  Chi2)    (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on MECOVI. In 1999 and 2000 the variables 
EdFhead and EdMhead have been dropped because there are very few educated heads. 
Notes: The number in parenthesis report z-statistics. Estimations performed using the 









                  Enrollment 
     1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007   
 
Age    -.107*** -.117*** -.065*** -.058*** -.163*** -.082*** -.048*** 
      (-2.36) (-4.24) (-7.98) (-7.85) (-6.15) (-4.95) (-2.60) 
 
Male    .097*  .032*  .020  .052*** .070**  .096*** .012 
      (1.36) (1.29) (0.87) (2.46) (1.39) (2.63) (0.57) 
 
Indigenous    .020 .030 .083***  .062***  .040 .120***    .040* 
      (0.49) (1.13) (3.52) (2.69) (0.76) (2.96) (1.53) 
 
Urban            .159  .093**  .164*** .100*** .133*  .115*** .045** 
      (1.22) (2.10) (6.13) (4.01) (2.02) (2.90) (1.69) 
 
Spanish           .154  .125**  .187*** .145*** .265**  .161**  .037 
      (0.83) (1.87) (3.98) (3.93) (1.90) (1.97) (0.91) 
 
EdMHead         dropped dropped -.002  .076**  .176*** .165*** .045**   
      (-0.63)  (2.25)  (2.70)  (3.30)  (1.68) 
 
EdFHead        dropped dropped  -.003  .077** .416***  .155** .016 
      (-0.52)  (1.69)  (2.78)  (2.11)  (0.31) 
 
Extr. poor       -.011   -.064** -.039* -.044**  -.012  .072** -.033 
      (-0.23) (-1.81) (-1.51) (-1.81) (-0.22) (1.73)  (-1.36) 
 
BJP                      . . . . . . .072** 
          ( 1 . 7 0 )    
 
                   Attendance 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007   
 
Age    -.051*  -.066***  -.007** -.005** -.042** -.019***  -.000 
      (-1.56) (-2.96) (-1.74) (-2.13) (-2-25) (-3.39) (-0.42) 
 
Male    .065*  .023 -.003  .006 .034 .025 -.020 
     (1.53)  (0.76)  (-0.17)  (0.58)   (1.09)  (0.97) (-1.07) 
 
Indigenous        .104**  .168*** .117*** .182*** .280*** .194***  .192*** 
      (1.98) (4.59) (5.94) (8.58) (5.16) (7.32) (6.89) 
 
Urban            -.070*  .082*** .173*** .192*** .014  -.056**  -.048** 
     (-1.43)  (2.47)  (8.93)  (7.70) (0.42) (-2.05)  (-2.20) 
 
Spanish          .327*  .368*** -.072*  .046**  .086  .176**  .065*   
     (1.48)  (4.46)  (-1.59)  (2.17) (0.79)   (2.21)  (1.38) 
 
EdMHead         dropped dropped .005  .062*** .023  .079*** .124*** 
      (0.22)  (2.85)  (0.66)  (2.55)  (4.09) 
 
EdFHead        dropped dropped -.037**  .076*** .195**  .054  .094**   
      (-0.72)  (2.32)  (1.79)  (0.82)  (1.74) 
 
Extr. poor       .012  .035  .006  .036*** .046*  .144*** .134*** 
      (0.30) (1.13) (0.33) (2.86) (1.38) (5.17) (5.34) 
 
BJP                      . . . . . . -.006 







Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 
                     Working 
        1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007   
 
Age    .044**  .085*** .050*** .062*** .056*** .058*** .048*** 
      (1.97) (5.44) (9.51) (13.47) (2.87)  (6.97)  (5.56) 
 
Male    -.020  .104*** .089*** .100*** .137*** .048*  .074*** 
     (-0.47)  (2.55)  (4.18)  (4.59) (3.31) (1.37) (2.47) 
 
Indigenous        .101**  .058*  .058*** .068*** .170*** .033   .003 
      (1.95) (1.56) (2.72) (3.00) (4.11) (1.06) (.12) 
 
Urban            -.406***  -.202***  -.244***  -.291***  -.275***  -.293***  -.228*** 
      (-6.29) (-3.18) (-7.81) (-9.96) (-3.53) (-5.21) (-4.33) 
 
Spanish          -.299*  -.200***  -.116***  -.205***  -.138  -.178**  -.048   
     (-1.67)  (-2.10)  (-2.65)  (-5.90) (-1.05) (-1.31) (-.87) 
 
EdMHead         dropped dropped -.026  -.059**  -.099**  -.041  -.070** 
      (-1.18)  (-1.72)  (-2.06)  (-.79)  (-2.26) 
 
EdFHead        dropped dropped -.054  -.016  -.175**  -.196**  -.081   
      (-1.08)  (-0.31)  (-1.96)  (-1.92)  (-1.21) 
 
Extr. poor       .055  .041  .054*** .062*** .056*  .186*** .083*** 
      (1.03) (1.24) (2.56) (2.62) (1.41) (5.43) (2.61) 
 
BJP                      . . . . . . .035 
          ( 1 . 0 9 )  
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on MECOVI. In 1999 and 2000 the variables 
EdFhead and EdMhead have been dropped because there are very few educated 
heads. 
Notes: The number in parenthesis report z-statistics. Estimations performed using 
the expansion factor. *** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, * significant at 
10%. 
 